Meeting with the reality may be the biggest surprise for Vladimir Putin over the past six months. Turns out that reality has nothing to do with virtuality, in which today lives not only a large part of Russian society, but in which more and more immersed and the Kremlin itself. After all, these "political" and "public" in Russia has already started to move.
The truce in the East, even in the format of permanent fights, became possible in part because of Russia. The framework law on the special status of Donbass - intermediate target for RF and intermediate situation for Ukraine. This law does not suit anyone. But we all need time. Everyone is preparing for war.
Thus the actions of the Kremlin aimed at scrapping not only post-Soviet realities, but in General the post-war world, no doubt, will be continued in Russia itself. Moreover, the longer the Russian-Ukrainian war, "cold" or "hot", the more obessmyslivaet possible victory for Russia. If for no other reason that the victory of Russia in the long term is impossible in General.
Let's start with the fact that the long-term perspective is not formed. The strategy of the Kremlin today is substituted tactics that, in General, for the state, claiming the status of an Empire, or at least the leader in the region, it is simply indecent. Any action always has the motivation, but the Kremlin it is highly situational nature - tremor as a response.
The past six months, Putin's policy is the replacement of real, virtual, strategy - tactics, seriously - game. Actually outside of the virtual game space is not there. In turn, in the game space is no place for serious and long term. This is what Merkel called the loss of reality. A sort of attempt to oppose on a personal level, Homo faber ("man cresting) Homo ludens ("man the player").
In the book "Homo ludens" Johan Huizinga considering the game as a factor of culture, speaks about the universal value of human civilization. He believes that the displacement of games from cultural ideas of rationalism began in the XVIII century and ended in the nineteenth century. One of the Central concepts of the treatise "paulinism"describing unsuccessful attempts to return the game. Polarism is a mixture of games and seriously, when is perceived as a serious game, games and activities to get serious. Eventually blur the distinction between serious and frivolous.
The policy of the Kremlin is polarism, the surrogate's activities and propaganda-organized excitement, a mixture of new and old ideologies, modernism through archaic. As a result, absurditie only. Appeared, for example, a new Imperial style in journalism - a mixture of denunciation and public flattery (though, the idea is that these are two completely different genre). The search for enemies, that is, those for Ukraine, and flattery Putin at the same time as a way of journalistic reflection on what is happening. The innovator of this style, of course, Sergei Kurginyan. The next stage of absurditie, apparently, is the emergence of movements "Putin", "Putin is our"everything " type of red guards of Mao Zedong. It will be not technological "Our", and these young nationalists fashistvuuschey power. Yes, in fact, Russia has already announced the intention to establish a civil detachments against the revolution.
The impression that the policy for Putin is the only space game. GDP behaves as the hero of the game, which, passing from one level to another, trying to get a new life. And in General, it even turns out - now the fate of Russia is directly related to the physiology of GDP. But the space maneuver narrows. This behavior pushes Russia into a dead end.
First, happened zeroing any projects in the post-Soviet space. It became clear that no rules are not in effect, and any reality can be about - and preintermediate anything. And if it be so, there is no sustainable conditions for integration associations.
Secondly, began to lose trust, even among allies. In the end, the position where Putin may want to look seriously seem frivolous. That is, lost denotation original value of every act and event. A classic example is the statement of GDP that Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan has not been statehood. Obviously, this message was meant as a compliment (say, no revolutions, the permanent President, stability and so on, that is, the legitimacy of the state is of a personal nature), but the opposite happened - Nazarbayev offended. Well, after that original intent is another scenario: the friendly intention turns aggressive incarnation - Russia declares that in September in Altai, almost on the border with Kazakhstan, will host a large-scale exercises of the Russian armed forces.
Thirdly, there is a narrowing of the reality outside the game space. The impression that the reality outside the virtual space for the Kremlin does not exist. Not so terrible propaganda (though it brought no less evil citizens of the Russian Federation, than the Ukrainian East), as that, in addition to propaganda, nothing more. No politics or economy. This means that at some point the process will begin to live its own life. As it turned out, Russia has no adult explanations of the broken G-8 Lavrov says that Russia did not exclude members of the "Big eight", just foreign partners have missed the summit in Sochi". Interestingly, it will be the same arguments and vocabulary to operate when next year Russia will host a summit of the BRICS? At the same time seriously in the media discusses the news that Putin invented a new character for the program "good night, kids!"
Fourth, can work the principle of the boomerang. The Kremlin does not feels any threat of erosion of the Russian-Ukrainian border. Although Rostov already infected people with weapons. Dirt mixed with blood and hatred, will return back to Russia itself. Even Kadyrov as hopelessly banal people (in the political sense of the word), probably understands this. In addition, if Putin considers it appropriate to joke about the possible capture of Kiev, then it can at some point start to joke. And "polite men with weapons in their hands may appear somewhere in Russia.
Fifthly, isolationism together with not solved internal problems is a dead end. The nearest surrounding Putin, of course, puts on a brave face, but the fall of the regime, as shown by the history of Russia, always begins with the collapse of the system from the inside. Especially when you consider that, as the resolution of systemic problems emphasis on their conservation and a red herring in the form of "external enemy". Russia speculates on the Soviet past denationalized ideological Empire, but, however strange it may sound, is facing the need to build a civilized version of nationalism as the basis for gaining the identity of the state. Russia is talking about the "Russian spring", while for Russia in view of the scale and multiethnic state, this problem is extremely important. And instead of trying to solve it, the Kremlin is constantly trying to find a surrogate civilized version of nationalism. After Marsh 2011 has been marked exacerbation of Orthodox propaganda, which led to the opposite effect. The Church as an institution looks to the past, not the future, it is in principle nothing wants to change - and in this case, the dialogue with Muslims and other faiths to build will not work. Now the Kremlin has redirected the Russian request for a civilized format nationalism outward, focusing on Ukraine as the enemy. Thus the request to the satisfaction of nationalist requests within the Russian Federation is reflected in the external aggression of Russian nationalism. And this is also a road to nowhere.
In this sense, the fate of Ukraine, despite its weakness as a state, is more intuitive than the fate of the Russian Federation, even if the worst case situation. Assume that Russia will continue to destroy Ukraine, up to large-scale military invasion and capture not only the Donetsk and Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts. Resource mobilization to war with Ukraine at the level of society in Russia is still there. In Ukraine, Putin will be perceived as an occupant even his supporters, will begin a long guerrilla war, rises the question of the return not only regions, but also in the Crimea.
Formula Ukrainian patriotism is very clear: "Glory to Ukraine! - Glory to the heroes!"
Russian is no formula: "Glory to Russia! - Crimeaour? - Putin, ourall?"
And that's why the next President Putin of Russia, whatever the political system and the boundaries of the Russian Federation itself, would certainly say that the policy of the GDP in relation to Ukraine was wrong.
Olesya YAKHNO
Source: http://uainfo.org/
